What are Physical States? by Boughn, Stephen
What are Physical States?† 
 
Stephen Boughn⋇ 
 
Department of Physics, Princeton University, Princeton NJ 
Departments of Physics and Astronomy, Haverford College, Haverford PA 
 
Abstract 
The concept of the physical state of a system is ubiquitous in physics 
but is usually presented in terms of specific cases.  For example, the 
state of a point particle of mass m is completely characterized by its 
position and momentum.  There is a tendency to consider such states as 
“real”, i.e., as physical properties of a system.  This rarely causes 
problems in classical physics but the notion of real quantum states has 
contributed mightily to the philosophical conundrums associated with 
quantum mechanics.  The Einstein-Rosen-Podolsky paradox is a prime 
example. In fact, quantum states are not physical properties of a system 
but rather subjective descriptions that depend on the information 
available to a particular observer.  This realization goes a long way 
toward resolving such dilemmas as Schrödinger’s cat, wave function 
collapse, quantum non-locality, and parallel universes. 
 
 
Introduction 
The notion of the physical state of a system is a crucial concept in physics as well 
as in other disciplines.  For macroscopic objects, quantities like temperature, pressure, 
composition, etc., are sufficient to characterize a state.  Of course, such descriptions leave 
out a great deal of information about a system, in particular, the details of the 
microscopic constituents of the system.  However, if a system is comprised of a single or 
of a few particles, both classical and quantum mechanics assume that a proper physical 
state includes all possible information about the system.  In the case of a quantum system, 
Einstein famously concluded that the quantum state (quantum wave function) “does not 
provide a complete description of the physical reality”.  Bohr, and probably many other 
physicists, would disagree.  The following is my pragmatic take on the completeness of 
such physical states.  																																																								†	This	essay	should	be	considered	a	companion	to	“Against	‘Reality’	in	Physics”	(Boughn	2019)	⋇	sboughn@haverford.edu	
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Physical States as Complete Descriptions 
For a specific observer, the physical state of a system, whether it be a classical or 
a quantum system, is the complete description of the system consistent with the 
information about the system possessed by the observer.  By “complete” I mean that from 
such a description, the observer can predict the results of all possible observations of the 
system, whether they be precise or statistical in nature. Furthermore, the dynamical 
theory of the system can be used to compute the time evolution of the physical state and, 
therefore, to predict the results of all possible future observations.  Note that this 
definition of physical state is specific to a particular observer.  A different observer with 
different knowledge of the system might well assign a different physical state to the 
system and that state can also be considered complete provided that it can be used to 
predict the results of all possible observations of the system by that observer.  Therefore, 
the physical state is not a physical property of a system but rather is an observer 
dependent yet complete description of that system. 	 In	classical	mechanics,	one	might	insist	that	there	is	a	true	physical	state	of	a	system	but	some	observers	might	simply	lack	the	information	necessary	to	identify	the	 true	 state	 and,	 therefore,	 can	 only	 specify	 an	 approximate	 state	 based	 on	 the	information	 available	 to	 them.	 	 Classical	mechanics,	 even	 statistical	mechanics,	 is	amenable	to	the	notion	of	hidden	variables,	and	so	permits	this	interpretation.	 	On	the	other	hand,	such	a	declaration	of	“truth”	is	metaphysical	in	the	sense	that	it	adds	nothing	 to	 the	 utility	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 physical	 state	 delineated	 in	 the	 previous	paragraph.		If	the	specified	state	enables	the	observer	to	make	accurate	predictions	(whether	exact	or	statistical)	of	all	future	measurements,	then	that	state	satisfies	the	criterion	of	being	a	complete	description.	On	the	other	hand,	an	“approximate	state”	might	imply	predicted	results	that	are	inconsistent	with	what	is	actually	observed.		For	example,	if	the	approximate	state	indicates	a	given	uncertainty	in	position,	e.g.,	a	Gaussian	distribution,	but	the	observations	of	such	states	result	in	a	precise	value	of	the	position	or	a	distribution	of	positions	that	is	narrower	than	that	implied	by	the	approximate	 state,	 then	 the	 specified	 state	 is	 simply	not	 the	 complete	description	required	by	a	“physical	state”	of	the	system	(as	defined	above).			
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	 In	quantum	mechanics,	 the	notion	of	 a	 true	 physical	 state	of	 a	 system	runs	into	trouble.	 	The	quintessential	example	is	an	entangled	state.	 	If	two	components	of	 an	 entangled	 system	 are	 spatially	 separated,	 then	 an	 observation	 of	 one	 of	 the	subsystems	results	in	new	information	for	that	observer,	in	which	case	the	observer	is	 entitled	 to	 update	 the	 quantum	 state	 describing	 the	 entangled	 pair.	 	 This	 is	euphemistically	referred	to	as	“state	reduction”	or	“collapse	of	the	wave	function”.		If	there	were,	indeed,	a	true	physical state, one is tempted to consider state reduction as a 
physical process, in which case that part of the state describing the remote entangled 
subsystem will also be instantaneously reduced, a seeming violation of relativity.  This is 
the source for claims of quantum non-locality.  On the other hand, as long as the remote 
observer lacks knowledge of the results of the observed subsystem, the original quantum 
state will provide a complete description of all future observations, by that observer, of 
the remote subsystem.  In other words, the notions of a true physical state and state 
reduction are again metaphysical appendages that add nothing to the utility of the state 
concept. 
 
The EPR Paradox 
 The 1935 paper by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) considered the case of 
an entangled pair of particles.  The states of the two particles were presented not as 
descriptions by observers but rather as “descriptions of reality”, i.e., true physical states.  
EPR then find a contradiction in these assumptions and conclude: “the description of 
reality as given by a wave function is not complete.”  
Let’s investigate the entangled state scenario in more detail using the Bohm spin 
singlet system, the same system employed by John Bell in his seminal paper on the EPR 
paradox (Bell 1964).  The system consists of the emission of two oppositely moving spin 
½ particles in a singlet state, that is, the spins of the two particles are precisely opposite 
each other but in an undetermined direction.  According to quantum mechanics, their 
combined wave function (quantum state) is given by 
  Ψ 1,2 = !! |1, ↑ !|2, ↓ ! − |1, ↓ !|2, ↑ !    (1) 
where ↑ and ↓ indicate the up and down z components of the spins of particles 1 and 2.  
Now suppose that the spin of particle 1 is measured with a Stern-Gerlach apparatus 
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oriented in the 𝑧 direction and is determined to be ↑. Then we “know” that the z 
component of the spin of particle 2 will be ↓ and the “true” state of particle 2 will be 
instantaneously reduced to Ψ 2 = |2, ↓ !.  On the other hand, the original wave function 
can also be expressed in terms of the x components (or in any direction for that matter) of 
the spin, Ψ 1,2 = !! |1, ↑ !|2, ↓ ! − |1, ↓ !|2, ↑ ! .   
Then, if the spin of particle 1 is measured with a Stern-Gerlach apparatus oriented in the 𝑥 direction and is determined to be ↑, the spin of particle 2 will be ↓, and the “true” state 
of particle 2 becomes Ψ 2 = |2, ↓ !, a state fundamentally distinct from |2, ↓ !.  The 
immediate transition of particle 2 to either the state |2, ↓ ! or |2, ↓ !, depending on the 
measurement performed on the distant particle 1, is the basis for claims of “action at a 
distance”.  Both Einstein and Bell accepted this picture but while Einstein was abhorred 
by such “spooky action at a distance”, Bell embraced it as a demonstration of the “gross 
non-locality of nature” (Bell 1975).  
Now let’s look at this scenario from the perspective of a subjective description of 
“state”.  For the entangled singlet state considered above, Einstein would conclude 
particle 2 has no unique (real) state.  Let me push back on this conclusion.  After their 
emission, the polarization of neither particle is known.  Therefore, the two particles can 
be considered as two unpolarized particle beams.  For the observer of particle 2, this can 
be represented by a 50% mixture of spin up, |2, ↑ , and spin down, |2, ↓ , states (in any 
direction), a so-called mixed state.  A mixed state cannot be described by a pure quantum 
state (e.g., Schrödinger wave function or vector in Hilbert space) but is well described by 
its associated density matrix 𝜚,  
  𝜌 2 = !! |2, ↑ 2,↑ + !! |2, ↓ 2,↓           (2) 
with a similar expression for particle 1.  This density matrix completely characterizes the 
spin measurements of particle 2 with no mention of what measurements are made on the 
other particle.  For example, Eq. (2) implies that a measurement of the spin component in 
any direction will yield ↑  for 50% of the measurements and ↓  for 50% of the 
measurements subject to the usual statistical fluctuations. The measurement made on 
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particle 2 is completely independent of any measurement carried out on particle 1.1   
 Okay, so far so good.  Nevertheless, you may object that these single particle 
mixed states are mute on the correlations of measurements made on the two states.  Fair 
enough, but now you are asking a different question.  That is, after making these 
independent measurements, what are the correlations between them?  To answer this 
question, to be sure, one needs the pure entangled state of Eq. 1 but this expression in no 
way implies that the measurements made on particle 1 have any effect whatsoever on the 
measurements made on particle 2 or that individually these measurements are other than 
those predicted by the density matrix of Eq. 2.  
 So after the measurement of particle 1, what is the quantum state of particle 2?  Is 
it still the density matrix 𝜌 2  of Eq. 2 or is it the wave function |2, ↓ !?  The premise of 
this question is wrong.  The quantum state is not an “it” in this sense.  The only “it” is the 
quantum system, the spin ½ particle.  The quantum state is not a physical property but 
rather a description of a physical object, and that description depends on the information 
available to a particular observer.  For Observer 1 who has just observed particle 1 to be 
in the ↑ state, the available information leads to Ψ 2 = |2, ↓ ! while for Observer 2 the 
appropriate state is still given by the density matrix 𝜌 2 . For a probabilistic theory like 
quantum mechanics, confirmation can only come through the measurements of an 
ensemble of identically prepared systems. For observer 2, the results of such 
measurements will be completely described by the density matrix of Eq. 2.  Precisely the 
same is the case for Observer 1 prior to the observation of particle 1.  After the 
measurement, Observer 1 is justified in specifying the state of particle 2 as either |2, ↑  or |2, ↓ , depending on the result that measurement.  Finally, suppose that the results 
obtained by Observer 1 are communicated (subluminally, of course) to Observer 2.  With 
this additional information in hand, Observer 2 will naturally specify Ψ 2 = |2, ↓  or |2, ↑  to be the quantum state of particle 2 depending on this information. The point is, a 
quantum state is a subjective description that depends on the information available to a 
specific observer. 
 																																																								1	After	all,	the	measurement	made	on	particle	2	could	be	made	in	advance	of	even	selecting	the	type	of	measurement	to	be	made	on	particle	1.	
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Entangled Classical State 
There is a simple classical analog of an entangled two-particle state.  Suppose 
there are two balls, a white ball and a black ball.  The two are randomly placed in either 
of two boxes. The boxes are closed and sent off in opposite directions where they 
encounter observers who open the boxes.  In this case, the entangled state is a 50/50 
mixture of a white ball in box 1 – black ball in box 2 and a black ball in box 1 – white 
ball in box 2.  On the other hand, it’s clear that each observer has a 50/50 chance of 
finding a white ball and a 50/50 chance of finding a black ball and so is justified in 
describing their subsystem as a 50/50 mixtures of white ball in the box and black ball in 
the box.  This can be confirmed by compiling the data from multiple (random) trials of 
the experiment. There is no set of observations performed on an ensemble of random 
trials that disagrees with this prediction, i.e., the 50/50 mixture of white and black balls 
constitutes a complete description of boxes 1 and 2.  If Observer 1 finds a white ball, that 
observer is justified in “collapsing” the entangled state to a white ball in box 1 and a 
black ball in box 2.  However, until this information is transmitted to Observer 2, the 
complete description of that observer is still give by a 50/50 mixture of white and black 
balls in the box and this describes the predictions of future observations of box 2. 
As in Bohm’s spin singlet quantum system, it is also clear that the findings of the 
two observers will be completely correlated; if the observer of box 1 finds a white ball, 
the observer of box 2 will necessarily find a black ball and vice versa.  So for an observer 
privy to the results of the observations of both boxes, the appropriate description is the 
mixed entangled state. As in the quantum case, we would never claim that the act of 
observing a white ball in box 1 causes a black ball to appear in box 2.  Einstein would not 
be bothered by this situation because, in his view, there is a true physical state of each 
subsystem and so there is no necessity for positing the physical process of state reduction.  
We’ve already noted that such an assertion is completely compatible with classical 
physics. However, as was pointed out above, these considerations are metaphysical and 
don’t add to the utility of the notion of a physical state.2  (Of course, quantum 																																																								2	This	toy	model	of	an	entangled	classical	state	may	seem	a	bit	contrived;	however,	there	is	a	well-defined	probabilistic	formulation	of	classical	mechanics	based	on	the	Hamilton-Jacobi	formalism	on	configuration	space	wherein	the	notion	of	entangled	states	and	mixtures	is	completely	natural.		(Hall	&	Reginatto	2016)	
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entanglement is a much richer phenomenon than classical entanglement and exhibits all 
the aspects of quantum interference with which we are familiar.) 
 
Final Remarks 
The notion of a physical state as a “complete description” need not encompass all 
the information about the system.  For example, one might characterize the position and 
momentum of an electron with a spatial wave function that neglects any mention of the 
spin state of the electron.  In this case, the wave function can still be considered to 
provide a complete description so long as observations are limited to position and 
momentum and there are no magnetic fields that might couple spin with the spatial 
trajectory.  Similarly, the white ball/black ball classically entangled state presented above 
can still be considered complete so long as the plethora of other properties of the balls 
(e.g., mass, density, temperature, composition, etc.) are irrelevant to subsequent 
observations of the system. 
In the abstract I indicated that characterizing physical states as subjective 
descriptions “goes a long way toward resolving such dilemmas as Schrödinger’s cat, 
wave function collapse, quantum non-locality, and parallel universes”3.   Wave function 
collapse and quantum non-locality were addressed directly in the paper.  It should be 
clear how to apply the notion of subjective states in the resolution of other conundrums in 
physics, and particularly in quantum mechanics, but I’ll leave this task to the reader.  
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